• 0 Posts
  • 17 Comments
Joined 2 years ago
cake
Cake day: August 14th, 2023

help-circle

  • Yep. We can look at the source to see what their metrics are. They have economic freedoms and personal freedoms.

    The metrics for economic freedoms they used are fiscal and regulatory freedom. Focusing on fiscal, that branches down into: state taxes, local taxes, government spending, government employment, government debt, and “cash & security assets.” It’s obviously a libertarian based definition of “economic freedom”, wherein they feel someone with $5 to their name and no obligations is more economically free than someone with $100 to their name and $10 of taxes. Completely illogical bullshit.

    But you can look at it and see that a lot of them are incoherent or intentionally overlapping even if you buy into their base ideology.

    Why are government spending and government taxation separate entries? Is someone with low taxes less “economically free” because their government budget is able to afford to be larger anyway? Why does government employment factor in at all? Surely — especially after you’ve accounted for any budgetary, taxation, and debt based impacts — there’s nothing inherent to government employees existing that can be argued to impact someone’s “economic freedom.” Even within their base libertarian fantasies, the overlap and design of the categories will specifically make a richer, but otherwise completely identical, state less free than a poorer copy-cat.

    The rest of their categories are even more bullshit. They have an entire section under personal freedom categorized as “Travel Freedom.” A sane person might define that as both the right and the capacity to travel places. They define it as “This category includes seat belt laws, helmet laws, mandatory insurance coverage, and cell phone usage laws.” So a state is less “free” according to Cato if it makes it illegal to text while driving.

    tl;dr it’s all libertarian bullshit.


  • Election law varies from state to state. But generally from what I gather, a write-in candidate is only valid if the candidate registers with the state in advance.

    If there’s a winning plurality for Mickey Mouse in your state for a statewide office, it won’t matter. The state won’t be forced to see if there’s anyone there that has the name Mickey Mouse and then pick which (if more than one) was the individual meant by the voters. Someone has to register with the state saying that they’re going to run a write-in campaign for office with name XYZ.

    Note that these details are a bit of a side track. The above person was talking about Trump being excluded due to the 14th amendment. However that doesn’t say “not on the ballot” — it invalidates people from office entirely. If applied to Trump, the not being on the ballot would be a consequence of being determined ineligible for office, not a method to make him unable to win. Also it’s all moot: while I think on the face of it the correct action would be to apply the 14th amendment to Trump, the fact of the matter is that this will not happen. States are not going to be willing to risk the political backlash from going down that path, so they will not.



  • It should be done, but Biden has never had the opportunity.

    The size of SCOTUS is set by statute, and would need a law passed by the house and senate to do so. Democrats don’t hold the house today, but did in the prior congress. That vote likely could have succeeded. It would have failed in the senate. At the time the senate was 50-50 and I cannot possibly imagine any scenario where Manchin and Sinema would have voted for that law. King and Feinstein wouldn’t have been certain votes either, but likely winnable if it came down to the wire. Even if all of them did vote aye, regular legislation can be filibustered and there is definitely 0% chance that Manchin+Sinema would have voted to kill the filibuster.

    Dems need a house majority and at least a 52-48 senate majority for this to happen. I suspect that rage has already faded enough that it won’t happen even then, barring SCOTUS doing more Dobbs sized awful decisions.


  • The pressure campaign for RBG to retire was when democrats still held a senate majority with 53 seats. Republicans blocked Obama’s SCOTUS appointment when they held the senate majority. In 2016, republicans simply just didn’t allow a vote to happen because the senate leader sets the vote schedule. The nuclear option had already been invoked by that very same dem caucus on all other presidential nominations too.

    The scenarios look similar on a surface level but in the details that matter they are leagues apart. If RBG had retired in 2013 or (most of) 2014, her replacement would been confirmed, barring a Kavanaugh-sized scandal. Either republicans would have provided the seven votes needed to secure cloture, or Reid would have invoked the nuclear option to lower the cloture requirement on SCOTUS nominees to a bare majority, like all other positions. Either way the nominee would have been confirmed.


  • I’m more willing to forgive members of the house running despite their old age than I am senators.

    Representatives only serve two years, so they’re making a shorter commitment. It’s substantially easier for someone to think they can keep doing something for another two years than it is for them to think they can do it for another six years. Especially on health matters. But also, individual representatives are simply just less important. In our current political environment, an individual senator leaving office is going to be a huge disruption for any balance of power that’s less than 54-46, with another critical point reached at the 60-40 balance. In the house it won’t matter for any caucus that’s ahead by ~5+ seats. Even in today’s razor close house, it was elected as 222-213 seats — a nine seat gap.

    There’s a decent number of older representatives out there. I wouldn’t have minded Lee sticking around there for a bit longer. The only real issue with older representatives is that by staying in office they block the pipeline for new blood and building a bench for future offices. Running for senate in her late 70s is ridiculous though, especially for a first term.

    For Pelosi specifically, I’d put it at 50-50 odds that she retires shortly after the 2024 election. If it wasn’t for her personal feud with Hoyer I’d put it at near-certain. When she decides to retire, I expect she’ll stick around for one last campaign solely because it will improve her ability to fundraise for the DCCC. She’s a team player through and through.



  • I think it’s simpler.

    As things are in Texas right now, anyone he is replaced with will be a conservative republican. There is zero political risk to republicans in removing him. His only constituency within the party is the furthest right loons… but they tend to abandon “losers” quickly and will happily latch onto the newest far right loon. All while keeping him around does represent a political cost to republicans. That cost has gotten high enough that they’re willing to consider removing him.

    They can remove him with no risk to their power and get rid of a headache at the same time.



  • The problem is that it depends on how you assess it. There are two, both perfectly valid, ways to look at this.

    The way you’re looking at it is you see it as a state-only contest. B got the fewest votes, B’s votes go to C, C wins the state. The end. From an administrative level this is the simplest approach. I don’t feel any need to expand on this assessment as you’re in favor of it and seem to grok the principles behind it.

    The other, equally correct, way to look at it is to assess this as a national contest. In that case, C is the one that actually gets the fewest votes because they have 0 electoral votes in any other state. C is incapable of winning, so C would be eliminated in the first round of the state level contest. After all, one of the points of RCV is to eliminate the impact of spoiler candidates that cannot win. With that in mind, it’d be dumb to design an RCV system that increases the impact of a spoiler candidate that cannot win.

    The issue with the first interpretation is the risk of magnifying the impact of a spoiler candidate who cannot win. The issue with the second interpretation is the sheer administrative difficulty (if C were competitive in multiple states then each state needs to take into account how other states are doing their RCV process, etc.). Both flaws would be unlikely to matter >99% of the time, but that one time the flaw would matter could lead to a constitutional crisis or less dangerously result in fundamental dislike of RCV systems. That one time might also become more likely if voters feel more comfortable voting for third parties due to this system.

    The problem here is that both systems are fair, logical, and valid; they also each present major issues in edge scenarios. That’s why it’s important to go for a popular vote first. That way the election is one election, which RCV is explicitly designed for. The current two layer 51-elections that lead to another election that we have for the US presidency is basically a nightmare scenario for an effective RCV system.


  • Some democrats don’t like RCV (see the DC thread from the other day), but many do. NYC has RCV, and I assure you it didn’t get there without democrats supporting it. So does Maine.

    RCV wouldn’t work well for presidential elections as they are anyway, because it’s a two-stage election. What would RCV mean in an individual state? Pretend a 3rd party is in contention in that state but has no chance nationally. Candidates A and B are the major parties, and C is our third party. If the results are C=40, A=35, B=25, and B’s support transfers to C, and C’s support would transfer to C, does that mean B should be eliminated so C can win the state, or should C be eliminated (because they won’t win any other states) and B should win the state? There’s no obvious answer and it just invites more of a clusterfuck.

    RCV is great for popular vote elections, which is what everything else is (mostly… there’s… I think it’s Mississippi governor?) and what the presidential election should be.

    Popular vote first, RCV second.


  • Which is… never. At least for presidential elections. I can’t speak for the marriage proposals.

    The Republican party didn’t appear out of nowhere in 1860 to win a presidential race. They were formed in 1854 and supplanted the Whig party entirely before the 1860 election. It was a majority party throughout the north before it won a presidential race — it wasn’t a “third party.”

    Likewise, Democrats replaced the Democratic-Republican party in much the same way that republicans replaced the Whig party, and had been a major party from its very beginnings. Literally in their first election there were only two parties running!

    There are only three other parties that have won the presidency: Federalists (there from the inception of the party system), Democratic-Republicans (ditto), and Whigs (major party years before first electoral win). There’s been no “third party” that has ever won the US presidency. All three have the same story as democrats as starting off in an election with just two parties.


  • That’s the argument they’re trying for in court, which is not the same as what they think. The reality is much more mundane. Probably more frustrating too.

    Ranked choice voting makes it easier for incumbents to lose. It makes it harder (but still… not actually difficult) for retiring office holder to coronate their hand-picked successor. That’s all this comes down to. Especially in a place like DC that votes for a single party by such wide margins. Places that lopsided, in a FPTP primary system, once elected a politician is all but incapable of losing. Even to horrible, horrible scandal.

    Ranked choice threatens that. If DC switched to it overnight, >90% of the incumbents would win reelection trivially. In fact I’d be surprised if any of them that ran again lost. But they don’t like that it goes from just short of a guarantee, to still really highly certain.


  • West is a nothingburger. If you think he’ll impact anything other than a 2000-redux, you’re spending too much time on online politics. Same deal for the GOP splitting. Manchin, quite simply, won’t run for president. He likes attention but he’s not dumb. He might be an asshole but dumb is the last thing he is, and if he wanted to sabotage the democratic party he’s had far better opportunities to do just that for years.

    Trump wasn’t Obama either, and his popularity went up. Obama wasn’t even “Obama” (as we think of him today) at this stage stage in his presidency. The year three slump is not some historical aberration or oddity. All three of them had near identical polling numbers (~40 up, ~50 down) at this stage in their presidency. Clinton wasn’t looking much better at this stage either: mid 40s approve, low 40s disapprove at this stage. He went on to have the largest popular vote win (nine points!) we’ve had since Reagan’s win in 1984.

    Polling now is borderline worthless.


  • This is a common sentiment for people to have, but their preference runs into a major problem. There is no magic “young Biden” candidate out there that can unify the party.

    If Biden announced tomorrow that he was going to retire rather than run for reelection, there would be an absolute clusterfuck circus of everyone and their mom’s roommate’s cousin’s dog jumping into the dem primary. Sanders — who is even older than Biden — has even implied that he would run in this scenario. Harris would get a lot of institutional support, but nowhere near enough to clear the field. Newsom would jump in. A solid half dozen house representatives with no real chance would jump in. As would some other has-beens or insufficiently qualified people. A few governors would take the chance too. It would take months for the race to whittle down to the core 5-6 people with any real chance, and by that time >$100m would have been pissed down the drain. Any establishment candidate that won would be met with instant distrust from large parts of the progressive left, and any progressive candidate that won would be met with similar levels of distrust from the rest of the party.

    The primary would be acrimonious, expensive, and long. Dems would toss aside one of their biggest advantages going into next year — money — as Trump is more likely than not to tie up the republican primary comparatively early.

    “We need a younger, popular person to be our nominee” is a trivial thing to wish for. It’s an exceedingly non-trivial thing to make happen. Every person pining for such a person is imagining very different democrats as fitting that description.

    The time for new is 2028. We picked Biden in 2020 and picking a candidate one year comes with an implicit outcome of picking them in the next election, if they win the first time.


  • Polling is volatile and things move quickly in elections, especially when they’re over a year apart.

    This time in 2011, Obama was polling about the same as Biden is now: low 40s approval, low 50s disapproval. Gallup’s Aug 8-14 2011 poll had Obama at 40 approve/52 disapprove. For that matter Trump in 2019 was seeing similar numbers. In early fall 2020 and 2016, Trump was polling in the complete dumps and the polls were predicting landslide dem wins. Early fall 2008 showed McCain slightly more likely to win than not. Fall polling in 2012 showed a bare Obama advantage, but there was enough data there saying that Romney was going to win that without sites like 538, it wasn’t at all obvious who was favored.

    It could be that Biden will remain weak. But people were predicting that Biden’s weak approval numbers were going to hurt in the 2022 midterms, and it was easily the best dem midterm in decades. If not for CA and NY dropping the ball dems would have even held the house! Which is basically insane. There’s no reason to be confident that the polling data will stay the same. In fact, it’s almost certain that polling numbers will change, and dramatically, in the months ahead. In which direction is far less certain.

    The point being… Polling, today, of an election in fifteen months, is borderline worthless. We also have one data point suggesting Biden’s weak numbers aren’t actually an albatross at the ballot box.